In the Gray Area by Seth W. B. Folsom

Author:Seth W. B. Folsom
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Published: 2011-02-13T16:00:00+00:00

Chapter 20

Personalities and Paradigms

On 11 April more details about the artillery cache discovery surfaced, and it became apparent that, more than likely, the ordnance had not been planted. The battalion S-2 officer showed Lieutenant Ski video of the junood unearthing the rounds from the riverbank.

“We’re both on there too,” Ski commented to me later, referring to the tape. “I’m sure our photos will be on Al Jazeera tonight.”

Regardless, it still seemed somewhat underhanded, and I continued to believe the entire episode had been staged as some sort of showcase. Whether it was for the benefit of the battalion commander or me, I didn’t know. Little doubt existed that it was an old cache, and we estimated that it probably dated back as far as Operation Steel Curtain in 2005. Nonetheless, Ayad still wanted to plan a cache-sweep operation for an island that was directly north of the site, and that evening he told me he needed boats to conduct the mission. The U.S. Navy had a riverine operations detachment stationed at Camp Al Qa’im, and while I knew the sailors from the riverine squadron would be ready and willing to undertake such a task, I also knew that I didn’t need to be doing Ayad’s job for him.

“Request them through Brigade, sadie,” I told him through Mason. “Seventh Division has boats you can use . . . you just need to ask for them.”

“Division will never give them to us,” he replied, shaking his head in disappointment.

“How do you know that?” I asked.

“No one at Brigade or Division will ever do anything to help us,” he replied.

“But you won’t know that unless and until you ask them,” I said, frustration rising in my voice. “Look, request the boats through the brigade. We will look into how the Coalition might be able to support the operation if you don’t get any results from your higher headquarters. But you need to ask your chain of command first.”

Convincing 3rd Battalion’s staff to engage the brigade headquarters was routinely an exercise in futility. The notion of higher headquarters acting as a supporting effort for its subordinates was lost on the Iraqis, and both Ayad and his staff patently refused to enlighten their counterparts at 28th Brigade with that concept. Whether asking for support was perceived as a sign of weakness or poor stewardship of his battalion, Ayad continued to avoid raising support issues with Colonel Ra’ed. We were there to help find Iraqi solutions to Iraqi problems, but the IA officers seldom seemed willing to try to help themselves. They preferred that the MiTT did the work for them, and that was a habit I committed myself and my team to changing. If we ever wanted to get out of Iraq the IA would have to learn to deal with problems on its own. It was turning out that, for the IA, fighting the insurgency was the easy part. The difficult part would be tackling organizational and cultural roadblocks that had plagued the army even before the Americans invaded in 2003.

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